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BENJAMIN H. LORING
RURAL DYNAMICS 
AND PEASANT RESISTANCE 
IN SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTAN, 
1929-1930*
In the fall of 1928, Soviet and party leaders of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic
resumed the Civil War practice of requisitioning grain. The requisitioning relied on
the “Urals-Siberian method” — forced deliveries and the suppression of private
trade — and marked the end to the New Economic Policy (NEP). It was followed
later by dekulakization (the dispossession and deportation of purportedly rich,
exploiting peasants) and collectivization, both of which provoked intense
resistance from the peasantry. In the fall of 1929 and again in the summer of 1930,
disorders and popular rebellion spread across vast swaths of rural Kyrgyzstan,1
mirroring similar patterns throughout the Soviet Union.2 
1. In this article, the term “Kyrgyzstan” refers to the territory of the present-day Kyrgyz
Republic. From 1927 to 1936, this territory was known as the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic (ASSR) and was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR). 
2. See, for example, Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin (New York: Oxford, 1996),
Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: the Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell,
2006), ch. 7. 
∗ The research for this article was supported in part by grants from IREX (International
Researches and Exchanges Board) and ACIE (American Councils for International Education)
with funds provided by the United States Department of State through the Title VIII Program
and the IREX Scholar Support Fund. None of these organizations is responsible for the views
expressed. I would like to thank Lynne Viola and the other participants of the SSRC Eurasia
Program Dissertation Development Workshop “Violence in Eurasia” at Yale University in
March 2007 for their critiques and suggestions on an early version of this paper. I am also
grateful to Gregory L. Freeze (Brandeis University), Daniel Prior (Miami University, Ohio),
and Christian Teichmann (Humboldt University) for their comments on subsequent drafts.
Finally, I am thankful to the three anonymous reviewers at Cahiers for their comments and
suggestions.
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When described this way, the dynamics of state action and resistance to it seem
clear: the state bears down on society and society resists through demonstrations,
revolts, murders, as well as less confrontational forms: flight, sabotage, and other
“everyday forms of peasant resistance.”3 In fact, as many scholars have pointed out,
both state policy and resistance to it were diverse and complex.4 Policy reflected
lower-level officials’ interpretations of state priorities and their capacity for
implementing them. It has become a truism that neither the Soviet state nor Soviet
society constituted a monolith; divisions and tensions within each locale shaped
outcomes at the local, district, regional, republic, and all-Union levels. The nature
of the reaction to state policy was likewise problematic: Soviet officials often
ascribed political motivations to actions which may or may not have had them.5 The
aims, forms, and timing of actions subsequently deemed acts of resistance varied
and bore the imprint of local economic and social dynamics. This article aims to
examine such variations within the context of collectivization in 1929 and 1930 in
southern Kyrgyzstan.
The article attempts to contribute to the already substantial literature on Central
Asia under Soviet rule. To be sure, peasant resistance to Soviet collectivization in
1929-1930 has been a major focus of research, especially in the last fifteen years.6
Most studies, however, have looked primarily at Russia proper.7 In the case of
Central Asia, the scholarly community has only recently begun paying attention to
resistance to collectivization, focusing thus far primarily on Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan.8 Much of the scholarship, moreover, does not include in its analysis
3. By this, I am referring to the term James C. Scott uses to describe “the ordinary weapons of
relatively powerless groups.” See his Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant
Resistance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1985), xv-xxii. 
4. Lynne Viola, “Popular Resistance in the 1930s: Soliloquy of a Devil’s Advocate” in Michael
David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Marshall Poe, eds., The Resistance Debate in Russian and
Soviet History (Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2003), 70-80. 
5. Ibid., 75.
6. Two of the most widely cited works are Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin (New
York: Oxford, 1996) and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the
Russian Village after Collectivization (New York: Oxford, 1994). Others important
contributions include Tracy McDonald, “A Peasant Rebellion in Stalin's Russia: the Pitelinskii
uprising, Riazan, 1930,” in Lynn Viola, ed., Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power &
Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 84-108, and
James Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province: a Study of Collectivization and Dekulakization
in Siberia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), especially p. 92-159.
7. One such exception is Bruce Grant, “An Average Azeri Village (1930): Remembering
Rebellion in the Caucasus Mountains,” Slavic Review , 63, 4 (2004): 705-31. 
8. For an example of the newer scholarship on Kazakhstan, see Turganbek Alleniiazov,
“‘K zachistke bandelementa pristupit´ nemedlenno…’. Dokumenty Semipalatinskogo OGPU
1931 g.” in Istoricheskii Arkhiv 11/3 (2003): 137-154, Isabelle Ohayon, La sédentarisation des
Kazakhs dans l'URSS de Staline: Collectivisation et changement social, 1928-1945 (P. :
Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006), 179-221, and Niccolò Pianciola, “Famine in the Steppe: the
collectivization of agriculture and the Kazak herdsmen, 1928-1934,” Cahiers du Monde russe,
45, 1-2 (2004), 154-170. For Turkmenistan, Adrienne Lynn Edgar’s recent monograph
provides an excellent study of resistance to collectivization. See Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal
Nation: the making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, NJ: PUP, 2005), chapter 7. 
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regional and sub-regional dynamics, the examination of which can provide a
context for acts of resistance in Central Asia.9 The article incorporates archival
materials from central (Moscow), republic (Bishkek), as well as regional (Osh)
repositories to situate events locally and provide their immediate context. The study
draws primarily on documents of state, party, and OGPU (secret police) organs.
Naturally, this source base reflects the biases and limitations of Soviet agents and
officials. At the same time, however, the volume and detail of the materials make
them valuable to examining the complex interactions between the Soviet
government and rural society. 
Despite southern Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic, cultural, and economic diversity, the
region witnessed a series of similar violent demonstrations and revolts across its
territory in the spring and summer of 1930. The grievances of the rural population
included not only forced collectivization, but also a string of increasingly onerous
policies, which the agents of the Soviet regime had clumsily imposed over the
previous several years. Although these policies affected different segments of the
population in different ways, by the spring of 1930 they had driven large segments
of the agrarian population to open rebellion. Forced collectivization was merely the
trigger for an explosion of long-simmering discontent. Lynne Viola has written,
“[o]nly the combination of shared interests under threat from a common foe in the
context of extreme and generally sudden and short-term duress could serve to paper
over the normal everyday divisions that run through a society.”10 In southern
Kyrgyzstan, this extreme, sudden, short-term duress was the collectivization
campaign of January-March 1930, but it came at the end of a longer period of
growing tensions.
The article is divided into five sections. The first three discuss the socio-
economic and political context for the resistance. They demonstrate that, while the
Soviet state’s policies were universally unpopular, these policies had different
consequences for different segments of the population. In the last two sections, the
article examines acts of resistance both before and after the November plenum. To
avoid mischaracterization, the article will only look at acts of “active” resistance:
mass demonstrations, assault of murder of state personnel, destruction of state
establishments, and so forth. The article finds that the resistance initially varied in
its form, timing, and intensity according to the nature of the economic and social
impact of state policies on the local population in different areas of the region.
Later, the resistance took on a generalized form as a large contingent of the
population in various localities took part in the resistance. The article attempts to
explain this shift in the conclusion. 
9. To be sure, the above-cited works by Bruce Adams and Tracy McDonald take pains to
reconstruct the local context for acts of resistance to collectivization. 
10. Viola, “Introduction” in Viola, ed., Contending with Stalinism… 
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“Cottonization” and its effects, 1925-1928
Soviet economic policy in the late 1920s included plans to integrate Central Asia
into the all-union Soviet economy; the goal was to make Central Asia a chief source
of raw materials (above all, cotton) for Soviet industrialization.11 In the 1920s,
Central Asia (without Kazakhstan) accounted for 75 percent of the cotton grown in
the Soviet Union.12 Although the region had restored pre-war production levels by
1927, it still could not meet the demands of the Soviet textile industry, which had to
import 41 percent of the necessary cotton fiber.13 In a speech in September 1927,
Isaak Abramovich Zelenskii, the secretary of the party’s Central Asia Bureau,
exhorted party officials and state bureaucrats to “liberate” the Soviet Union from
dependence on capitalism by increasing the production of cotton in Central Asia.14
At the same time, however, the productivity of Central Asian cotton farming had
fallen since Tsarist times, as it was based on small-holder production, and only by
increasing the sown acreage could production levels be maintained.15 Therefore,
the rising demand for cotton forced the party leadership in Central Asia to seek out
new ways of achieving higher levels of cotton production both by expanding and
intensifying it. 
As the principal economic planning agency for Central Asia, the Central Asian
Economic Council (SredAzEKOSO) had used a variety of ways to increase cotton
production. Between 1922 and 1926, the state Cotton Committee (Khlopkom) had
purchased cotton at a fixed ratio of 2.5-3 times the price of grain.16 This, however,
turned out to be a very costly policy, as the state’s purchases increased. In
November 1926, the Central Asian Economic Council replaced this scheme with
one of subsidizing wheat sales to cotton farmers: state-run cooperative stores
11. In Central Asia, industrialization itself had always been secondary to agricultural
development: compared to the European parts of the Soviet Union, Central Asian industrial
expansion was very modest in absolute terms (though significant relative to pre-Revolutionary
levels) throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and migrants from European areas of the USSR staffed
what few mines and factories did exist. See Alec Nove and J.A. Newth, The Soviet Middle
East: A Communist Model for Development (New York: Praeger, 1966), 46-47, William
Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central Asia,” in William Fierman, ed., Soviet
Central Asia: the failed transformation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 18-19, Ian
Murray Matley, “Industrialization (1865-1964),” in Edward A. Allworth, ed., Central Asia:
130 years of Russian dominance, a historical overview (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1994), 330-331, Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927 (New York:
Columbia, 1957), 311.
12. R.W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: the collectivization of Soviet agriculture, 1929-1930
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 19.
13. Ian Murray Matley, “Agricultural Development,” in Edward A. Allworth, ed., Central
Asia: 130 years of Russian dominance, a historical overview (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1994), 289-290.
14. “Sredneaziatskie respubliki — syr´evaia baza SSSR”, Pravda, 02 October 1927, p. 4.
15. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, 313-319.
16. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 314-315; OOGA (Oshskii oblastnoi gosudarstevennyi
arhiv — State Archive of Osh Oblast), f. 1, op. 1, d. 88, l. 8 (Prezidium SredAzEKOSO,
“Protokol zasedaniia,” 18.10.1926).
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charged 1 ruble 50 kopecks per pood17 of wheat to cotton growers; 1 ruble
81 kopecks for everyone else in cotton-producing regions (this while locally grown
wheat was selling for 2 rubles 20-30 kopecks per pood in markets).18 In 1926-1927,
therefore, the state successfully expanded cotton production by making local grain
production less attractive, but in turn, it had to shoulder the burden of providing
cheap grain to cotton-growing regions. The Central Asian Economic Council found
that it could not ensure the quality of the state-supplied wheat, which could be of
such poor quality that peasants frequently preferred to pay more for the higher-
priced locally grown equivalent.19 By 1927, state economic bodies had already run
up against the limits of “cottonization” and began seeking alternatives to subsidies
to expand cotton production. 
The Land and Water Reforms — party-directed programs of property
redistribution in each of the Central Asian republics — offered just such an
opportunity. In general, the Land and Water Reforms of the mid-1920s were designed
to accomplish in Central Asia what the agrarian revolution of 1917-18 had achieved
in European Russia, namely the dispossession of landlords and religious institutions
and the equalization of property-holdings among peasants.20 The reforms’ principal
goal was therefore not economic development, but social equalization; the reforms
did, however, create an important role in the agrarian economy for the state, as its
institutions — most importantly, the Cotton Committee — now functioned as the
principal creditors in areas affected by the land reforms.21 As most peasants relied on
credit, the Cotton Committee now used credit schemes to force peasants to increase
deliveries of cotton. This remained the principal means of expanding the acreage
under cotton cultivation until the forced collectivization of 1930. 
Increasing cotton production also had important ramifications outside cotton-
growing areas. In the first place, an exclusive focus on cotton production meant that
grain and draft animals increasingly had to come from other areas of Central Asia.
By 1927, officials were requisitioning draft animals for use in cotton-growing areas
affected by the land reform.22 Grain imports from Russia reached all-time highs by
17. A pood was a Russian unit for measuring grain roughly equal to 36.11 pounds or 16.38
kilograms.
18. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 88, l. 8-11 (Prezidium SredAzEKOSO, “Protokol zasedaniia,”
18.10.1926). 
19. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 88, l. 28 (Prezidium SredAzEKOSO, “Protokol No. 10,” 02.11.1926).
20. I.A. Zelenskii, “O zemel´no-vodnoi reforme v Srednei Azii (doklad na plenume
SredAzBiuro TsK VKP(b) ot 14 marta 1925 g.” in I.S. Kraskin, ed., Zemel´no-vodnaia reforma
v Srednei Azii: sbornik materialov (M.: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1927), 24-27.
21. One survey cited by a Soviet economist claimed that of 1132 households in Margelan uezd
of Ferghana Oblast in Uzbekistan, the Cotton Committee supplied 85 percent of the credit used,
a far larger amount than the 10 percent supplied by private individuals. See A. Davydov,
“Zemel´naia reforma i kredit”, Narodnoe khoziaistvo Srednei Azii 1925, no. 12-13, 21.
22. TsGA PD KR (Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi arhiv politicheskoi dokumentacii Kyrgyzskoi
Respubliki — Central State Archive for Political Documentation of the Kyrgyz Republic),
f. 10, op. 1, d. 130, l. 65-74 (“Plan zagotovki rabochego skota dlia zemleustraivaemogo
naseleniia iuzhnykh kantonov v 1927-1928 godu,” 1927).
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1927, exceeding prewar levels by 25 percent, according to official data.23 At the
same time, however, the Central Asian Economic Council made a policy of only
requesting grain from outside Central Asia when it had exhausted supplies in the
region.24 As grain was less forthcoming from outside after 1927, the Council and
other economic organs had increasingly to rely on food supplies within Central
Asia to make up the difference. 
This burden fell heavily on the grain-growing areas of Kyrgyzstan, especially
the northern ones, in spite of the protests of officials in Kyrgyzstan. In the winter of
1927-1928, as in the rest of the Soviet Union, state organs in Kyrgyzstan began to
requisition grain. Aziiakhleb, the state grain trust in Central Asia, was to
redistribute this grain to cotton-growing regions. Determined to exceed the original
quotas on grain deliveries to the People’s Commissariat of Trade, the Kyrgyz oblast
party committee (or obkom, the chief party organ in the Kyrgyz autonomous
republic) sent a delegation of its members into several of the grain-growing districts
of northern Kyrgyzstan in April 1928. Their success in coercing grain from
reluctant producers only led to higher quotas: Zelenskii even demanded over-
fulfillment of the grain delivery plan by 100,000 poods (1,600 metric tons, about 66
percent of an already ambitious quota) in order to provide the grain for further
“cottonization.”25 In response, V.P. Shchubrikov, then the secretary of the obkom,
sent off a telegram declaring Zelenskii’s demands “completely impossible” in the
face of that year’s widespread crop failure throughout the southern districts and
dzhut (massive livestock die-offs after heavy icing in pastoral areas) in the north.26
Zelenskii held firm, and the obkom bureau acquiesced to his demands: one month
after confiscating all the grain that obkom plenipotentiaries (upolnomochennye)
could find, they repeated the exercise to the consternation of the grain-producing
peasantry in the northern districts.27 
The grain requisitions campaign in spring 1928 marked an important turning
point for the Communist leadership in Kyrgyzstan: it was the last time that the
obkom leadership, specifically the European obkom secretary, objected to the
demands of Zelenskii’s Central Asia Bureau. Within a year, Shchubrikov had been
replaced by Mikhail Maksimovich Kul´kov, a former assistant to D.I. Manzhara,
the Central Control Commission plenipotentiary in Central Asia
(upolnomochennyi TsKK v Srednei Azii) and a staunch ally of Zelenskii. Kul´kov
23. Matley, “Agricultural Development,” 287.
24. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 88, l. 73-84 (Prezidium SredAzEKOSO, “Vypiska iz protokola
No. 13,” 1926-12-15/16).
25. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 155, l. 3 (Ispolbiuro Kirgizskogo Obkoma, “Protokol
No. 22,” 13.05.1928). 
26. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 155, l. 16 (V.P. Shchubrikov, 12.05.1928). In fact, dzhut
ultimately killed off 12 percent of the republic’s livestock in the winter of 1927-28, see
M.G. Sakharov, ed., Osedanie kochevykh i polukochevykh khoziaistv Kirgizii (M.:
Tsentral´noe biuro kraevedeniia, 1934), 84.
27. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 155, l. 3; TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 181, l. 135 (F. Kekin,
“No. 7/04273,” 22.07.1928). 
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exhibited no independence from the Central Asia Bureau during his two-year
tenure as party secretary. The obkom, with the occasional exception of its member
Iusup Abdrakhmanov,28 raised no more objections to the increasingly burdensome
requisitions targets from Moscow and Tashkent under his leadership. 
Southern Kyrgyzstan, 1925-1929
In March-April 1929, the obkom and Central Executive Committee (CEC)29 of the
Kyrgyz ASSR in Frunze cobbled together Osh okrug from Osh and Jalalabad
cantons, the two regional subdivisions of southern Kyrgyzstan.30 The large territory
included wide demographic and climatic variation, encompassing over 400,000
inhabitants in 10 districts (raiony). Within the okrug, forms of agricultural
production varied: in some areas, settled agriculture predominated; in others,
nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism did. In most districts, the two were mixed.
Forms of agricultural production, along with the social and ethnic make-up of the
inhabitants, were primary considerations for economic planners and party officials
in drawing up the districts. The republic’s economic planners and political
leadership saw the development of Osh okrug in terms of three distinct agricultural
zones: cotton, grain, and livestock.31 
The Cotton Zone
The cotton zone of Osh okrug was the most densely populated part of the Kyrgyz
territory. It was located in the low-lying areas of the Ferghana valley assigned to the
Kyrgyz autonomy during the national delimitation of 1924, comprising Aravan-
Buria and the lower reaches of Bazar-Kurgan and Jalalabad districts as well as
smaller swaths of Kyzyl-Kiia and Uzgen district. According to official sources, the
population in these areas was overwhelmingly agrarian and included many Uzbeks.
Sedentary agriculture had predominated in these areas before the Russian conquest
28. Abdrakhmanov, the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) of the
Kyrgyz ASSR, wrote a letter to Stalin in November 1929 objecting to the interference in
Kyrgyzstan’s economic development by economic bodies in Tashkent and Moscow. See
Abdrakhmanov to Stalin, Moscow, November 1929 in Iusuf Abdrakhmanov, Izbrannye trudy
(Bishkek: Sham, 2001), 183-186. 
29. The Central Executive Committee was elected by the Congress of Soviets of the Kyrgyz
ASSR to be the leading body of the state apparatus in the autonomous republic.
30. Between 1926 and 1929, the Kyrgyz ASSR was made up of seven cantons (kantony): Osh,
Jalalabad, Talas, Frunze, Chui (merged with Frunze canton in 1928), Karakol, and Naryn. See
map p. 193. 
31. Grain production remained an extremely important activity in southern Kyrgyzstan
throughout the interwar period. This was mostly due to the unsuitability of many areas to
cotton-growing, due either to their higher elevations or lack of adequate irrigation for cotton
cultivation. 
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in the mid-nineteenth century, but cotton, not grain, made up a growing portion of
the region’s agricultural production from 1921 on. 
Well before mass collectivization, the inhabitants of Osh okrug had experienced
the state as an invasive and disruptive force. In the fall of 1927, the cotton-
producing areas of southern Kyrgyzstan underwent the Land and Water Reform,
which oversaw widespread land redistribution as well as a state takeover of water
allocation. Like the parallel policy implemented previously in Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, the reform represented an attempt to equalize peasant landholdings,
incorporate large parts of the peasantry into trade and production cooperatives,
rationalize and control land and water use, and, significantly, dissolve the waqfs
(endowments of land) which had supported the remaining religious schools and
institutions (the schools, too, were officially disbanded). As in the earlier reforms,
this one had not only the political goal of making society in southern Kyrgyzstan
more equal, but also the economic goal of rationalizing land use and encouraging
the production of technical crops, chiefly cotton.32 State and party officials had a
further (if tacit) objective: to confiscate private wealth in the countryside and make
the state the sole creditor and purchaser of cotton. By dispossessing the richest
peasants and creating state-controlled credit cooperatives, Soviet officials could
dictate what farmers grew and how much they received for it. In effect, the Soviet
regime substituted private exploitation with a state version: instead of paying off
debts to a lender or sharecropping for a landlord, the farmers of the Ferghana and
elsewhere were now indebted to the state and subject to its demands. The state’s
priority was cotton, and it enforced its priorities by offering advances of money,
seed, water, or equipment in exchange for contractual obligations to deliver
specified amounts of cotton.33 While the productivity of cotton-growing in southern
Kyrgyzstan declined after the reform, the state was able to obtain a larger amount of
cotton through these schemes: according to official statistics, deliveries of cotton to
state organs increased 38.1 percent between 1925 and 1928.34 
The agrarian population of southern Kyrgyzstan, no doubt apprised of the
changes in neighboring Uzbekistan, reacted to the land reforms in a variety of ways.
Land commissions, which assessed property for confiscation and redistribution,
frequently encountered staunch resistance from villages: though this rarely turned
violent, many peasants resisted assessments, hid land-holdings and farm
implements with poorer neighbors, and sought to mislead local officials.35 In the
32. “O zemel´no-vodnoi reforme (tezisy)” (resolution of the Second Plenum of the Obkom
VKP(b), 24-27.06.1927) in Kommunisticheskaia partiia Kirgizii, 142-144., TsGA PD KR,
f. 10, op. 1, d. 99, l. 42-44 (“Tezisy k dokladu o zemel´no-vodnoi reforme”).
33. Benjamin H. Loring, “Building Socialism in Kyrgyzstan: Nation-Making, Rural
Development, and Social Change, 1921-1932” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 2008), 216-
217. 
34. Kirgiziia v tsifrakh: statisticheskii sbornik (Frunze: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe
izdatel´stvo-Kirgizskoe otdelenie, 1963), 82. 
35. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 139, l. 85-86. (OGPU, “Infsvodka No. 10,” October 1927). 
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village of Suzak near Jalalabad, a visiting inspector from Tashkent provided this
account of the inhabitants’ resistance: 
[T]hose subject to confiscations are putting up the stiffest resistance.
Concealment of land (by splitting it up or by blatantly hiding it) is the norm.
[And] this is happening mostly with large amounts of land. The confiscation
work (ushchemlenie) has been completed in one kishlak36 (Iangy Suzak).
Thirty-four households have been assessed for confiscations. One means of
resistance is to increase the number of household members and [thereby] to hide
sharecroppers.37 
In many other villages, poor peasants assisted the land commissions in assessing
and dispossessing their richer neighbors.38 Although the reform succeeded in
undermining communal solidarity, it failed to provide an adequate foundation for
cooperative agriculture to take the place of previous economic arrangements. Many
peasants found themselves even worse off than they had been before the reform:
they now had more land, but lacked the means—tools, draft animals, and technical
skills—to exploit it effectively. As a result, cotton yields actually fell between 1925
and 1928, even while the state, thanks to its credit schemes, now claimed a larger
share of the total production.39 
The land reform, however, was not the only policy that caused discontentment in
the cotton zone. Dissolution of the waqfs, the campaign to unveil women, and the
general assault on religion (anti-religious propaganda, mosque closures, etc.) in
1927-1928 offended the sensibilities of many, causing outrage and, at times,
demonstrations against party initiatives.40 Chronic shortages in the cooperative
retail network, on the one hand, and heavy taxations and restrictions on market-
based trade, on the other, also provoked discontent as peasants had steadily poorer
access to consumer goods.41 As a result, by the winter of 1928, many segments of
the peasantry deeply resented the Soviet State,  according to the OGPU.42 
36. “Kishlak” referred to an older, usually Uzbek, village in the documentation of the Kyrgyz
party organization.
37. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 192, l. 157-158 (Vainer, letter to Zelenskii, 22.12.1927). 
38. Loring, “Building Socialism,” 213-214.
39. Ibid., 222.
40. One can see this, for example, in the reaction to March 8th unveiling campaigns in
predominantly Uzbek districts: TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 292, l. 15-16 (Gvozdenko,
“Doklad,” March 1928).
41. See, for example, the complaints by party members about high prices, poor quality, and
deficits in cooperative stores in Naukat district: TsGA PD KR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 243, l. 5-6
(“Svedeniia ot vsekh chlenov partii,” 19.02.1929)
42. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 278, l. 72-77 (“Politicheskaia informatsionnaia svodka
No. 5,” 13.01.1928). 
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The Grain Zone
The imports necessary to feed the cotton zone would come in part from Osh okrug’s
grain zone, especially as shipments from the rest of the Soviet Union declined after
1927 as the Grain Crisis worsened. The grain zone ringed the Ferghana valley at
somewhat higher elevations than the cotton zone; grain cultivation made up the
bulk of the agricultural activity in the cultivated areas of Uzgen, Kyzyl-Jar, Kyzyl-
Kiia, and Naukat districts. These areas had a more temperate climate, unsuited to
cotton cultivation, and officials of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan)
correspondingly deemed them grain-producing districts.43 Much of the land of the
grain zone had come under tillage since the Russian conquest of the region in the
mid-nineteenth century, and the area had been settled more recently and less
densely than the cotton zone. These areas were the most ethnically heterogeneous
in the okrug, with a mixture of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and, in some areas around
Jalalabad and Uzgen, Russians and Ukrainians. 
As in the cotton zone, the grain zone had experienced increasing state
involvement in the economy since the mid-1920s. Also like the cotton zone, some
areas in the grain zone underwent a program of land redistribution in 1927-1928;
here, however, the reform entailed less redistribution and, consequently, provoked
less resistance. Meanwhile, the NEP had revived grain production in these areas of
southern Kyrgyzstan, but by the mid-1920s, as in the rest of the Soviet Union, local
authorities sought to restrict the activities of private traders (chastniki) and obtain
more advantageous terms for state grain purchases.44 As discussed above, ensuring
adequate grain supplies in order to intensify cotton production became a central
concern of the Central Asian Economic Council as early as 1926, and it took an
active role in ensuring grain deliveries through economic organizations
(Aziiakhleb as well as the cooperative trade network).45 As discussed above, the
Central Asian Economic Council and economic planning agencies worked to
reduce Central Asia’s reliance on grain deliveries from Russia. An increase in
requisitions from within Central Asia and Kazakhstan offered a temporary solution,
as the state increased tax rates on rich peasants and individual smallholders
(edinolichniki), thereby privileging cooperative trade networks and collective
farms and encouraging their growth. The goal was to ensure that the state incurred
no losses and received a maximal share of the output.46 Although southern
Kyrgyzstan was spared the initial requisitions campaign in April-May 1928
43. I.I. Ibraimov, Bor´ba partorganizatsii Kirgizii za podgotovku uslovii sploshnoi
kollektivizatsii sel´skogo khoziaistva (1926-1930 gg.) (Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1967), 22.
44. Private trade in grain was unrestricted in southern Kyrgyzstan until August 1927, when, in
the face of skyrocketing prices and grain shortages in the state cooperative trade network, the
Osh canton executive committee banned private trade. See OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 111, l. 28
(“Protokol No. 9 zasedaniia frakstii Oshkogo kantispolkoma,” 14.08.1927)
45. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 88, l. 7-11 (Prezidium SredAzEKOSO, “Protokol zasedaniia,”
18.10.1926).
46. Ibid.
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(described above) due to crop failure, requisitioning by Aziiakhleb and other state
agencies returned to southern Kyrgyzstan in the fall of 1928. The policies of forcing
deliveries of grain at low prices ensured advantageous terms for the state but did not
endear themselves to the populace: OGPU reports in the fall of 1928 speak of
widespread “discontent” (nedovol´stvo) among grain-cultivators with the low
purchasing prices offered by Aziiakhleb, the state grain monopoly, and with the
quality of trade goods offered through the cooperative trade network.47 
The Stock-Raising Zone
Osh okrug’s stock-raising zone lay in the mountains and foothills around the
Ferghana basin. It comprised Ketmen-Tiube, Kurgart, Batken, Kapchigai, Alai-
Gul’cha, and Siuliukta districts as well as the mountainous parts of Kyzyl-Kiia,
Naukat, Uzgen and Kyzyl-Jar districts. These areas were far less densely populated
than the Ferghana basin, and their inhabitants, almost exclusively ethnic Kyrgyz,
were generally pastoralists who engaged in field cultivation only as a secondary
economic activity. Until the sedentarization campaigns of 1931-1934, most of these
pastoralists migrated for several months of the year to high mountain pastures
(known as jailoo), leaving their villages mostly empty. The region produced
livestock, which was sold at the bazaars of low-lying towns such as Kara-Suu, Osh,
Uzgen, Jalalabad and various cities in Uzbekistan through the early 1930s.
State institutions had little presence in these pastoral areas. The Red Army had
pursued the last vestiges of the so-called basmachi movement48 into the highlands
around the Ferghana Valley in 1923, but it was another 2 years before southern
Kyrgyzstan was safe enough for the obkom to recall weapons it had issued for self-
defense. 49 Even though the coercive apparatus of the Soviet government had
brought these regions under its nominal control, this was not sufficient to establish
a permanent presence in the highlands: these areas had few functioning Soviet
institutions such as schools, cooperative trade organizations, village soviets, party
and Komsomol cells, mass organizations like the Koshchi union, and so forth.
Hence, according to Soviet social scientists and government officials who studied
mountainous areas in both northern and southern Kyrgyzstan, tribal elites (referred
to in the Soviet literature as manaps in the north, biis in the south) allocated
47. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 181, l. 163-64 (Nikitin, “Spetssvodka No. 7 po
khlebozagotovitel´noi kampanii,” 18.09.1928).
48. The basmachi were Muslim Central Asians who had fought the Tsarist then Soviet regimes
from 1916 through the early 1930s. The term is a problematic one from a historical standpoint,
as it was not the term by which these fighters referred to themselves, but rather a Russian term
applied by the Tsarists/Bolsheviks to their adversaries. The term has, however, come into
common usage in Western historical literature to denote Central Asian anti-Soviet guerillas in
the 1920s and 1930s.
49. Aleksandr Igorevich Pylev, Basmachestvo v Srednei Azii: etnopoliticheskii srez (vzgliad iz
XXI veka) (Bishkek: Kyrgyzsko-Rossiiskii Slavianskii Universitet, 2006), 101-102; Loring,
“Building Socialism,” 74. 
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pasturelands and adjudicated disputes, a barter economy predominated, and Soviet
institutions outside district centers were practically nonexistent.50 Most Soviet
observers held the view that these areas remained inaccessible to the regime. Soviet
policy toward the mountainous stock-raising zone, therefore, aimed first and
foremost at overcoming this inaccessibility and establishing an institutional
presence, but these measures were very late in coming: only in 1929 did this zone
see substantial state-building activities.
The Grain Crisis: Requisitions and Confiscations, 1929
The grain shortages of 1928 grew more acute in Osh okrug at the beginning of the
first Five-Year Plan in 1929. After failing to secure adequate grain supplies in 1928,
requisitions the following summer throughout the RSFSR were even higher, as the
Commissariat of Trade mandated high delivery quotas from grain-producing
regions.51 The increased requisitions were to come from the “kulaks” — the
Bolshevik term for rich peasants who exploited “poor” and “middle” peasants. As
in the rest of the Soviet Union, state agencies assessed higher fees and taxes from
so-called kulaks and barred them from participation in municipal government and
the party.52 In southern districts, however, the “kulaks” had very little grain to
confiscate, as much of their property had already been confiscated in the land
redistributions of 1927-1928. Moreover, many small-holders depended on
government credit and hence contracted to produce cotton. As early as the summer
of 1927, the authorities remarked that Osh canton could no longer feed itself and
had become “purely a consumer” of grain.53 Efforts in the beginning of 1929 to
increase grain production through a state-sponsored sowing campaign did not result
in higher yields: instead, grain grew scarcer during the winter and spring.54 
The Kyrgyz obkom responded by imposing draconian measures to combat
private grain trading and increasing quotas for grain requisitions from Osh okrug by
50. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 118, l. 11 (Toichinov, 03.08.1926); TsGA PD KR, f. 10,
op. 1, d. 131, l. 65 (Tiurin, “Narynskie pastbishcha,” 1927) ; P. Kushner (Knyshev), Gornaia
Kirgiziia (sotsiologicheskaia razvedka) (M.: KUTV, 1929), 106-7. 
51. “Rasporiazhenie Narkomtorga SSSR ‘po priamomu provodu’ o forsirovanii
khlebozagotovok [4 maia 1929g.]” and “Postanovlenie VTsIK i SNK RSFSR ‘O rasshirenii
prav mestnykh sovetov po sodeistviiu vypolneniiu gosudarstvennykh zadanii i planov,’ 27
iiunia 1929 g.” in V. Danilov et al., eds., Tragediia Sovetskoi Derevni: kollektivizatsiia i
raskulachivanie, 1927-1939, 5 vols., vol. 1 (M.: Rosspen, 1999), 612-614, 659-660.
52. Though non-indigenous state and party officials generally used local terms for “kulaks”
(bai, boi) and recognized the existence of indigenous property regimes (for example,
charikerstvo, a form of share-cropping and/or labor obligations specific to certain areas of
Central Asia), their discussion of rural class relations in Kyrgyzstan usually displayed little
understanding of local conditions, and more often than not, they merely substituted Central
Asian labels such as “bai” for (equally as misrepresentative) Russian ones, such as “kulak.”
53. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 111, l. 28 (“Protokol No. 9 zasedaniia fraktsii Oshskogo
kantispolkoma”, 14.08.1927).
54. TsGA PD KR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 246, l. 53 (“Svodka No. 7”, 12.04.1929).
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58 percent in July 1929. The state cooperative trade network, meanwhile, continued
to degrade, and trade officials had to rely on stop-gap measures — a combination of
costly short-term incentives and outright coercion — to ensure grain deliveries.
Despite their best efforts, the okrug party organization soon found itself unable to
prevent local authorities from openly circumventing the Soviet trade system. In an
undated missive from the summer of 1929, the head of the okrug’s five-man
committee on grain requisitions (khlebnaia piaterka), a former trade official and
member of the okrug’s party bureau by the name of Chistiakov, issued a missive in
which he inveighed against the issuance of grain-trading licenses by local officials: 
In the bazaars and villages through all this the private trader (chastnik) is still
working; in plain view he pays excessively high prices, buys up grain and carts it
off […] More often than not, arrested wholesale buyers (skupshchiki) have
permits from village soviets stating that the bearers are workers who have
earned the grain, poor Uzbek peasants who have sown grain on the territory of
Kyrgyzstan, or cotton-growers who are buying grain for their own consumption.
With such permits, the struggle with unlawful grain-traders has become much
more difficult […] Any functionaries who are exposed to be giving out false,
incorrect, or insufficiently inspected permits will be quickly arrested and
prosecuted for abetting grain speculation.55
Village soviet officials, perhaps seeing an opportunity for profit with such high
grain prices, perhaps fearing for their fellow villagers’ economic and even physical
well-being, were openly defying the orders of party officials who sought to channel
all available grain into the state trade network. With the grain delivery regime in
chaos, little wonder that further deliveries from the grain zone failed to meet the
rising demand. 
Officials throughout the Soviet Union had been squeezing private traders out of
the marketplace and replacing them with the cooperative trade system since the
mid-1920s. In southern Kyrgyzstan, however, okrug officials lacked the
institutional means to do so as late as 1929. The five-man grain committee quickly
discovered that private traders were buying grain at twice the price offered by the
government. The state’s trade infrastructure proved utterly incapable of competing
with the private trader. Starting in September 1929, Chistiakov ordered that traders
be arrested for “profiteering” and brought to Osh for trial.56 A few days later, on
11 September, he ratcheted up the pressure on state, okrug, and district authorities
to ensure grain requisitions, demanding trials “in every village soviet” resulting in
“harsh sentences,” the arrest of “inactive” (bezdeistvuiushchikh) collective farm
chairmen, and prosecutions of anyone in arrears to the state.57 These draconian
measures were identical to those adopted by grain-delivery officials throughout the
Soviet Union: as authorities pressed district and local soviet officials to deliver
55. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 255, l. 104 (Chistiakov, “Tsirkuliar,” undated).
56. Ibid., l. 106 (Chistiakov, “Pochto-telegramma,” 03.09.1929).
57. Ibid., l. 108 (Chistiakov, “Prikaz,” 11.09.1929). 
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grain, prosecutors in each district took coercive measures, including imprisonment
and dispossession, against kulaks and private traders.58 Lacking the resources either
to control the private market or to compete with it, party authorities and prosecutors
in the districts of Osh okrug resorted to intimidation and plunder to ensure grain
delivery quotas.
While Kyrgyzstan was hardly unique in resorting to coercive means, the weak
institutional infrastructure, poor oversight, and the unfamiliarity of most European
party officials with local society virtually guaranteed that these onerous policies
would be implemented in the most ham-fisted way. According to the instructions
from okrug authorities, the grain from kulaks was to be seized by grain
requisitioning committees, troikas backed by party members and local authorities.
In some districts, however, the plan went awry. In Bazar-Kurgan, for example, the
requisitioning committees began in early September confiscating whatever grain
they could find, including that of poor peasants, the supposed ally of Soviet power
in the countryside.59 In Naukat district, the district party committee organized
“grain protection brigades” to prevent the transportation of grain outside the district
without its authorization.60 Some village soviet chairmen in Jalalabad were so
worried about ensuring grain deliveries through the Kyrgyz republic’s cooperative
trade network that they refused to allow the Central Asian grain trust, Aziiakhleb, to
purchase any grain from their village soviets, even where it was supposed to be
available for sale. That frustrated the okrug party committee as well as Aziiakhleb
officials in Tashkent, as economic organs there depended on the grain to feed
cotton farmers in the rest of Central Asia.61 Conflicts over grain deliveries in areas
of overlapping jurisdictions were common during collectivization throughout the
Soviet Union, but in southern Kyrgyzstan, an area where state and party saturation
was low and central control nominal, okrug officials could not avoid bureaucratic
infighting over increasingly scarce grain supplies.
Compounding the difficulties of the okrug party bureau was its weak influence
over village soviets and other organs of local governance. In part, this weakness
stemmed from the bureau’s composition: of its five core members, only the
secretary, E. Essenemanov, was Kyrgyz. The other four included the
aforementioned former trade official Chistiakov, the head of the okrug OGPU
Savinskii, an official in the Osh executive committee named Rumiantsev, and the
“executive secretary” of the okrug party committee Dvinov. The okrug party
58. Ibid., d. 327, l. 50-56 (Muldagaziev, “Dokladnaia zapiska ‘Rabota po Uzgenskomu
raionu’,” 04.11.1929). Soviet officials in charge of grain requisitions applied these measures
widely throughout the RSFSR after the June 1929 amendment to article 61 of the criminal code,
see Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization (New York:
Norton, 1968), 389-390.
59. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 256, l. 20 (Zherdin, “Dokladnaia zapiska,” 02.10.1929).
60. TsGA PD KR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 157, l. 103 (Ispolbiuro Oshokruzhkoma, “Protokol No. 40,”
27.09.1929). 
61. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 256, l. 262 (Chistiakov, “Telegramma,” 22.09.1929); Ibid., l. 263
(Boldyrev, undated telegram).
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bureau maintained close contact with the Central Asia Bureau, the OGPU, and,
especially, the obkom in Frunze, all of which were dominated by Europeans from
outside Central Asia. The okrug party bureau also maintained contact with the
district party committee secretaries, who were generally Europeans or Kyrgyz from
northern Kyrgyzstan (as in the case of Turiakul´ Aitmatov,62 the secretary of
Aravan-Buria district party committee). In other words, the overwhelming majority
of highly placed Communist party officials in Osh okrug had little knowledge of or
personal connection to indigenous society, and the bureau had far closer ties to
Russian-dominated organs outside the okrug. Furthermore, communications
between the party organizations and lower-tier governing institutions proved
highly problematic: not only were many village soviet chairmen unable to read
Russian, but they carried on correspondence with higher organs — if at all — in
Kyrgyz or Uzbek, virtually assuring that their missives would receive little or no
attention.63 Although party organizations throughout the Soviet countryside relied
on “plenipotentiaries” (upolnomochennye) to accomplish their requisitioning
targets, the cadre that directed the campaign was especially alien to the
communities of southern Kyrgyzstan.
Deportations and Rebellion, 1929
While officials at the okrug level struggled to assert their control over the localities
in the grain and cotton zones, they regarded the mountainous pastoral districts as a
lawless back country. Most officials believed that governance was either entirely
absent or corrupt to the point of complete ineffectiveness — a view of the
countryside widely held by Soviet officials throughout the Soviet Union. In rural,
especially mountainous parts of Kyrgyzstan, however, these beliefs also included
suspicion toward clan or tribal affinities. The pervasiveness of “clanno-tribal
relations” (rodovo-plemennye otnosheniia), many observers believed, undermined
Soviet state-building efforts. In a remote part of the mountainous Kyzyl-Jar district,
a later OGPU report characterized Soviet institutions in these terms: 
From 1924 to 1929 […] the Soviet apparat in the region was not only weak. […]
This county (volost´) was famous for bribes, extortion, and so forth. Because the
62. Turiakul´ Aitmatov (d. 1938) was a Kyrgyz born in the village of Sheker in present-day
Talas Oblast. He completed Russian secondary school (real´noe uchilishche) in Aulie-Ata
before the revolution and later served in various capacities in the Kyrgyz party organization and
Soviet administration in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1937, he was arrested and was executed a year
later. He is the father of renowned Kyrgyz author Chingiz Aitmatov (1928-2008). See Zainidin
Kurmanov, Natsional´naia intelligentsiia 20-30 godov: vklad v vozrozhdenie gosudarstvennosti
kyrgyzskogo naroda i bor´bu s totalitarno-avtoritarnym rezhimom (Bishkek, 2005), 373.
63. This two-tiered bureaucracy, whereby upper-level correspondence was exclusively in
Russian and lower-level missives exclusively in indigenous languages, prevailed throughout
Kyrgyzstan. Village soviet chairmen, furthermore, often carried on no correspondence with
district (raion) executive committees or other organizations during the 1920s. See Loring,
“Building Socialism,” 151-160, 180-181.
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previous apparat was made up of one clan or another, no matter what the
official’s class background was, he was under the complete control of the chief
(rodonachal´nik) of his clan and carried out taxation and other state functions
just as his chief instructed, as though the chief himself had hired the official,
promoted him, and was giving the marching orders.
It should be noted that before 1929 in this district no Soviet social reforms have
been carried out, and therefore the population only knew Soviet governance
because representatives came to collect taxes and other dues. These too were
subject to abuses and deficiencies in their practical implementation […]64
In the view of Communist officials, clan or tribal ties undermined Soviet rule in the
mountainous pastoral districts. As a result, the officials believed, these regions
were lawless and inaccessible to Soviet influence. The following comes from a
1929 report by the Soviet official, Kalpaev, sent to oversee a “summer pastureland
(jailoo) soviets” in Alai, an area in the Pamir Mountains south of Osh:
Few [Kyrgyz] are acquainted with Soviet construction. Obedience to local
organs and authorities is completely absent. […] Obedience to tribal elders
(aksakaly), to former Islamic judges (kazi), to bais, and to [former Tsarist]
county heads (volost´nye upraviteli) continues […] The population understands
nothing of [Soviet] revolutionary law (revoliutsionnaia zakonnost´); purchases
and sales of girls, fights, and murders continue […]65
This official likely stressed the weakness of Soviet institutions in order to
emphasize the importance and difficulty of his own task, but this passage typifies
the prevailing view among European Soviet officials of a lawless, frontier-like back
country in the mountainous areas. In their view, the revolution and the reforms it
engendered had passed these areas by. Extending the revolution to the mountains,
therefore, remained a central goal of the Kyrgyz party organization throughout the
late 1920s.
The first stage of this effort consisted of eliminating the influence of traditional
elites. In northern Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz party organization targeted manaps for
dispossession and exile from the Kyrgyz ASSR starting in 1926. This campaign
entailed first drawing up lists of manaps to be deported and then sending high-ranking
officials into the manaps’ home districts to coerce the cooperation of local officials and
the populace. Finally, the officials from Frunze next deported the manaps out of the
Kyrgyz ASSR with the aid of the OGPU.66 The OGPU and the CEC in Frunze included
southern Kyrgyzstan in their campaigns to dispossess and deport rural elites in
February 1929, when their representatives ordered the arrest and deportation of eleven
so-called “bai-manaps” and their families from the okrug as well as the confiscation of
hundreds of acres of land and thousands of heads of livestock along with yurts and
64. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 298, l. 15-16 (“Dokladnaia zapiska o politicheskom sostoianii v b.
Chatkal´skoi volosti, v sviazi s vozniknoveniem basmachestva,” 16.09.1929).
65. Ibid., d. 194a, l. 24-28 (Kalpaev, “Doklad o deiatel´nosti Alaiskogo Dzhailiaunogo
soveta,” 1928/1929).
66. Loring, “Building Socialism,” 167-180.
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household items.67 In several cases, the representatives of the CEC encountered
resistance from local officials. In Bel´-Auly, for instance, the chairman of the village
soviet along with a crowd of others demanded that the officials from Frunze either free
the “bai-manap” Chokobai Sasyev or arrest them as well.68 During the arrests of “clan-
leaders” (rodonachal´niki), the CEC officials recorded local resistance in which,
according to their testimony, the entire population of the surrounding environs took
part.69 One OGPU document contains a detailed description of the resistance of rural
Kyrgyz to the campaign in the Chatkal Valley of Kyzyl-Jar District, in what is now
Jalalabad Oblast. In February 1929, a seasoned OGPU official, Victor Antonovich
Margaitis,70 and two militia officers arrested two “bais” in Shakantar and Sumsar
village soviets. Local villagers, subsequently deemed in the report “clansmen” of the
two arrested men, surrounded and disarmed the two militia officers and threatened
Margaitis as he led the captives back to the district center. After a struggle, Margaitis
and the officers managed to escape from the crowd with their prisoners.71 According to
this and other accounts, although these deportation and dispossessions initially
targeted only eleven “bai-manaps,” they raised the anger of entire communities. 
Furthermore, unlike the earlier campaigns against rural elites in the northern
areas, the campaign against “bai-manaps” in the south also provoked a revival of
the basmachi. According to the OGPU report on Kyzyl-Jar district, the campaign to
deport “bai-manaps” and to exclude bais from elections in the village soviets led
one local leader, Istambek Chanybekov, to organize an armed “gang” (shaika) and
to begin attacks against Soviet interests. Chanybekov did not act in isolation:
according to the OGPU, he held a letter from Kurshirmat,72 one of the most
67. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 225, l. 141 (“Doklad o vyselenii bae-manapov iz predelov
KirASSR v 1929 godu,” December 1929).
68. Ibid., l. 143.
69. Ibid., l. 143-144. 
70. According to the brief biography contained in his personal fond in the Central State Archive
of the Kyrgyz Republic, Victor Antonovich Margaitis was born in 1894 in the town of Temir-
Khan-Shura (present-day Buinaksk, Dagestan, Russian Federation). His father, an agronomist
who hailed from Lithuania, died while he was still a boy. Margaitis completed secondary
school (real´noe uchilishche) in 1916, at which time he joined the Imperial Army. In 1920-
1922, he commanded a Red Army cavalry squadron on the Ferghana Front and took part in the
storming of Bukhara. From 1922 to 1923, he commanded Cheka/GPU troops in operations
against the basmachi around Kokand. Afterward, he remained in Central Asia, serving in
various capacities in the OGPU. In 1929, he became a member of the Communist Party.
Source: TsGA KR (Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi arhiv Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki — Central State
Archive of the Kyrgyz Republic), f. 2722, op. 1, “Predislovie.”
71. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 298, l. 16.
72. Kurshirmat (Shir Mukhammad-bek Gazi, 1895-1974) was born in the village of Garbaba,
near Margelan, Uzbekistan. His father had been an officer in the army of the Kokand khanate
and had fought against the Russian invasion before taking up farming. After the uprising of
1916, Shir-Mukhammad-bek joined the guerilla resistance against the Russians and eventually
became, in 1920, the leader of the largest basmachi army in the Ferghana Valley. After being
defeated by the Red Army in 1923, he fled to Afghanistan, from where he continued to engage
in “underground activity” through the 1950s. In 1953, he moved to Pakistan and then on to
Adana, Turkey, where he died two decades later. See Pylev, Basmachestvo, 214-217.
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powerful basmachi commanders during the Civil War, which called on all former
basmachi to “fight for ‘Islam.’”73 Chanybekov also sought arms and supplies from
other basmachi leaders in Talas canton (Kyrgyzstan) and Namangan Oblast
(Uzbekistan). In July 1929, his group, acting in concert with other groups, began
robbing cooperatives and economic organizations, killing party members, village
soviet officials, kolkhoz chairmen, and others working with the regime.74 The
basmachi similarly revived in other districts as well: by November, the OGPU
counted over a hundred active participants in violent, coordinated anti-Soviet
resistance throughout Kyzyl-Jar, Ketmen-Tiube, and Bazar-Kurgan districts. To
add to this number, Janybek Kazy75 and Iarmat Maksum, two basmachi leaders
during the Civil War, had begun attacking Soviet establishments and personnel in
Kyzyl-Kiia and Uzgen districts along the southern border with Chinese Kashgar.76
According to the OGPU’s own sources, both insurgent leaders enjoyed significant
support from the population: not only did presumed “class enemies” support them,
but village soviet chairmen collected funds for Iarmat Maksum, and Janybek’s
band swelled with scores of fighters.77 The given source base — reports by OGPU
officers — does not permit independent assessment of popular support, but it is
certainly true that the basmachi leaders were more active and more mobile in 1929
than they had been since the Civil War; it is therefore possible to surmise that they
enjoyed greater support and assistance from the rural population than previously.
Belatedly, the Osh okrug party bureau realized the strength of the basmachi
uprising and sought the aid of the Red Army to protect Soviet assets and personnel.
In mid-October 1929, the Osh okrug party bureau declared the entire territory
“troubled by basmachiism” (neblagopoluchnyi po basmachestvu).78 Dvinov and an
73. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 298, l. 18. 
74. Ibid., l. 19-22.
75. According to Pylev, Janybek Kazy (Sagynbaev, d. 1939) was “the leader of the Otuzoghly,
one of the most influential clans (rody) of the nomadic Kyrgyz in the Ferghana Valley” (Pylev,
Basmachestvo, 217). Janybek Kazy led a large contingent of basmachi against Soviet power
during the Civil War, but constant conflict with Kurshirmat caused him to make a separate
peace with the Bolsheviks in 1922. Janybek Kazy again took up resistance against the Soviet
government in 1927 in the wake of the Land and Water Reform and the first campaigns to
dispossess and deport manaps in northern Kyrgyzstan. After fleeing into Chinese Turkestan in
the summer of 1927, Janybek Kazy made repeated forays into Soviet territory throughout the
late 1920s and early 1930s. He likewise participated in the rebellion in Xinjiang against
Chinese rule before its suppression by Soviet and Chinese troops. In 1934, he fled to what is
now Pakistan and died five years later in Ishkomen (Ghizar district). 
76. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 360, l. 107 (Otvetsek Oshokruzhkoma, “Soobshchenie,”
05.11.1929)
77. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 229, l. 132-133 (ob) (“Dokladnaia zapiska o dvizhenii
basmacheskikh shaek na territorii Srednei Azii,” 01.09.1929); TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2,
d. 377, l. 51-52 (Dvinov, October 1929).
78. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 360, l. 96-98 (Ispolbiuro Oshskogo Okruzhkoma, “Vypiska iz
Protokola No. 43, p. 6,” 13.10.1929). Here, the term “basmachiism” connoted both the similar
nature of the anti-Soviet resistance to its previous incarnation during the Civil War as well as a
surprising continuity in leadership (Janybek Kazy offers an excellent example of this). The use of
the term also demonstrates the regime’s critical and uncompromising attitude towards the resistance.
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official (upolnomochennyi) of the Central Asian Revolutionary-Military Council
(revvoensovet) candidly reported that the poorly devised and implemented policies
of the okrug party bureau had led to the current situation. Specifically, the
“basmachiism” had stemmed from 
political tension in relation to the conduct of grain requisitions, the tax
campaign, the bond-selling campaign (zaim), the displacement of grain
cultivation [by cotton cultivation], the attack on the wealthy peasantry despite
the weak development of the party organization (for a population of 480
thousand, only 1800 members before the purge, and after it a further reduction
by 20%), the weakness of local Soviet organs, the resilience of clan relations, the
lack of a formed village group of supporters (kishlachnyi aktiv) and, without
question, the lack of adequate propaganda work during the latest campaigns.79 
Party and OGPU officials went on to request weapons, munitions, and funds from
the Revolutionary-Military Council to arm party members and protect Soviet
establishments.80 
Thus, at the very onset of Stalin’s Great Turn in November 1929, the Bolshevik
administration in Osh okrug was already in crisis. Outnumbered and poorly
coordinated over a sprawling territory, it had exhausted its administrative resources
and antagonized large segments of the population just as the November plenum of
the Central Committee signaled the introduction of forced collectivization. 
Mass-Scale Collectivization and Resistance, January-March 1930
Despite the precarious situation in which they found themselves in late 1929, Osh
okrug party bureau officials as well as party authorities in Frunze outwardly
displayed astounding optimism in planning for the republic’s collectivization. In
the initial aftermath of the November Plenum, republic party leaders intended to
introduce mass-scale (sploshnaia) collectivization into only one northern district,
Belovodsk. By early February 1930, however, this number had grown to six
districts in the republic, including Aravan-Buria and Bazar-Kurgan districts of Osh
okrug.81 Other districts in the okrug soon followed, and by the end of February,
sowing campaign officials (upolnomochennye po posevnoi; generally well-vetted
party members from outside the district and often Europeans) were introducing
mass-scale collectivization in the entire okrug.82 This development was not without
resistance from district party officials: often they voiced misgivings and needed to
79. Ibid., l. 107.
80. Ibid., l. 108-109
81. RGASPI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arhiv social´no politicheskoi istorii — Russian State
Archive of Socio-Political History) f. 62, op. 2, d. 2258, l. 39 (“Perechen´”). 
82. Ibid, l. 17. (Bel´skii, “Svodka po voprosu massovykh vystuplenii dekhkanstva v sviazi s
kollektivizatsiei v respublikakh,” 20.02.1930).
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be “persuaded,” at times with threats to revoke their party cards if they objected.83
Despite the apprehensions of the district party officials, the newspapers trumpeted
the participation of village soviet chairmen and ordinary citizens in the mass-scale
collectivization of Osh okrug.84 Such “dizziness from success” was common for
officials in the first months of the collectivization drive. It seems, however,
particularly out of place in a region declared just three months earlier to be
“troubled by basmachiism.” 
Far from expressing the runaway optimism of sowing campaign officials, other
observers had a more unsettling view of the collectivization drive in Osh okrug,
which was even by Bolshevik standards absurdly optimistic and poorly managed.
On 20 February, an official of the party’s Central Asia Bureau reported the
following from Jalalabad:
The entire okrug is being collectivized. Five districts are officially
collectivized, and six others are striving for mass-scale collectivization. The
administration and leadership in the localities do not fit the tasks at hand. The
plenipotentiaries have been very poorly vetted; almost no one in the district
knows what a kolkhoz is or how to organize one. The decision to collectivize
fully was carried out by administrative fiat (apparatnym putem) in the district
with very small groups of supporters in the villages. At the assembly [of future
members of the kolkhoz] the directorate was decided beforehand and put to a
vote as a formality. […] Kolkhozes were explained to the masses thus: signing
up for the kolkhoz is obligatory; those who do not sign up will be deprived of
water and government supplies, will have heavy tax burdens, and will be
deported from [Kyrgyzstan]. Moreover, the cotton quotas have provoked
popular discontent.85
Seen from the outside, even Soviet agents found the okrug officials’ relentless
collectivization brash and ham-fisted, a characterization that would have dire
consequences for the regional leadership just two weeks later.
The failure to lessen the severity of the new policies led to acts of resistance
almost immediately. Even before the large-scale uprisings in March 1930, coercive
tactics such as those detailed in the report above had provoked violent acts of
resistance by large groups. In the village of Adyr in Uzgen district, a crowd of 150
tore up the kolkhoz sign-up list and, according to an OGPU report, “tried to kill” the
plenipotentiary for collectivization.86 In a separate incident in the same district, a
group of 200 had likewise attacked a plenipotentiary for collectivization. When the
“instigators” were arrested, another group broke into OGPU headquarters in an
83. TsGA PD KR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 319, l. 26-28 (“Informatsionnaia zapiska tov. Dvinovu,”
28.02.1930).
84. See, for example, “Bazar-Kurgan budet kollektivnym!” Sovetskaia Kirgiziia, 3 March
1930, p. 2.
85. RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2258, l. 17. 
86. Ibid., d. 2141, l. 78 (PP OGPU v CA, “Massovye vystupleniia dekhanstva za vremia s
fevralia po 12e marta”).
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attempt to free the captives.87 Forced collectivization, the latest in a string of
hardships imposed by the regime, was already driving large groups of peasants into
open rebellion. 
The campaign to “liquidate the kulaks as a class,” the accompaniment to mass-
scale collectivization in 1930 throughout the Soviet Union, also provoked
widespread anger in southern Kyrgyzstan and further antagonized the very peasants
the regime was trying to win over. At first, party activists were instructed to
determine who was a bai or “kulak” by conducting inventories of peasant land,
livestock, and other possessions. In February 1930, in the wake of the Politbiuro
decree of 30 January, Central Asia Bureau organization changed the policy to a
simple formula: 2 to 3 percent of the households in areas of mass-scale
collectivization in Central Asia were to be “dekulakized” — dispossessed of
property and, in some cases, exiled from the district or even sent off to areas of
special settlement outside of the republic.88 In Osh okrug, as well as throughout the
rest of the Soviet Union, richer peasants began to slaughter or sell off their
livestock: according to a report by Manzhara, in one village, “kulaks and richer
inhabitants of the okrug authorities sold off 40 bulls and have been killing young
animals. This outrage has been committed in plain view of village activists, who
have taken no action.”89 The okrug party organization was powerless to ensure
cooperation at the local level. 
In the beginning of March, the violence increased as okrug party officials
pursued mass-scale collectivization. On 2 March, disturbances broke out in two
separate districts of Osh okrug. In Jalalabad district, after an official from the sowing
committee had announced that those not entering the kolkhoz would lose all their
property, a crowd of 400 began to beat up government employees. They sacked the
local village soviet, smashing furniture and destroying documentation.90
Meanwhile, in Aravan-Buria district, a crowd of 250, shouting, “Tear up the kolkhoz
lists!” attacked members of the Tepek-Kurgan village soviet during discussions over
the charter of a new kolkhoz.91 Two days later, disturbances erupted again in
Jalalabad district. At first, a large crowd of protesters surrounded the district
executive committee building, demanding the release of prisoners (those who had
87. Ibid., d. 2140, l. 97-98 (“Opersvodka No. 2,” February 1930).
88. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 220, l. 137 (Kul´kov, “Pochto-telegramma,” 27.02.1930). The
Politburo decree of 30 January 1930 established three categories of kulaks. The first were
deemed “counterrevolutionary kulak activists”; they were to be executed or imprisoned in
camps. The second group included the richest kulaks; they were to be dispossessed and exiled
out of Central Asia. The third group, making up the bulk of the so-called kulaks, was to be
dispossessed and settled outside of the districts of collectivization. See “Postanovlenie
Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) ‘O meropriiatiiakh po likvidatsii kulatskikh khoziaistv v raionakh
sploshnoi kollektivizatsii’, 30 ianvaria 1930 g.” in V. Danilov et al., eds., Tragediia Sovetskoi
Derevni: kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie, 1927-1939, 5 vols., vol. 1 (M.: Rosspen, 1999),
126-127.
89. TsGA PD KR, f. 10, op. 2, d. 435, l. 17-18 (Manzhara, “Svodka,” 25.02.1930).
90. RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2141, l. 77 (PP OGPU v CA, “Massovye vystupleniia…”).
91. Ibid., l. 78.
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resisted the collectivization drive), the arrest and execution of 16 collectivization
activists, and the restoration of rights of the “disenfranchised” (lishentsy).92 They
went on to destroy the district women’s club and turn in a petition with (in the words
of the local OGPU) “a number of counter-revolutionary demands.”93
On 6 March, another crowd of one thousand from the village of Suzak came to
the Jalalabad executive committee with demands to tear up the kolkhoz lists, return
confiscated grain, arrest the chairman of the kolkhoz and 24 activists, and free those
arrested by the OGPU. Preventing the district party secretary from speaking, the
crowd killed a party activist and surrounded the headquarters of the OGPU,
demanding the release of those arrested.94 The next day, rioters destroyed another
village soviet office in Jalalabad district, killing a sowing committee official. The
revolt, meanwhile, had spread to Bazar-Kurgan district. The following is taken
from an OGPU telegram: 
On the 7 March in Bazar-Kurgan district a crowd of about 400 demonstrated
against collectivization, demanding that authorities dissolve the kolkhozes, not
collectivize livestock and farm implements, and not unveil women. At the
beginning of the demonstration, the crowd killed two activists (one of them a
member of the raikom), wounded a militia officer, broke into the building of the
district executive committee, dragging out and then beating up the chairman of
the cotton association. The employees of [state] establishments and enterprises
have fled their workplaces—the establishments are in danger of being looted.95
Another report revealed that the crowd had killed two activists and wounded two
others.96 The authorities found themselves in danger of completely losing control
over the district. 
By the next day, 8 March, the revolts in Bazar-Kurgan and Jalalabad each
involved over 2,000 participants, many on horseback. These uprisings continued
the attacks and looting of the previous few days throughout most of the two
districts. The crowds demanded the dissolution of kolkhozes and other Soviet
institutions, return of confiscated grain and property, establishment of sharia law,
the release of prisoners, and arrest of party officials and activists.97 One OGPU
report characterized the use of women in the disturbances during the 8 March
holiday: “In general, the beating and eviction of officials was conducted by women
who were deftly used during the holiday by mullahs and ishans98. An oath was
92. The lishentsy were those members of the former elite status groups who were formally
disenfranchised by the first constitution in 1918; the class of legal outcasts persisted until 1936.
93. RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2141, l. 77.
94. Ibid. 
95. Ibid., l. 29 (PP OGPU, “Zapiska po provodu,” 08.03.1930).
96. Ibid., l. 76. 
97. Ibid., l. 76-78. 
98. “Ishans” were the blanket Soviet term for rural Muslim clerics who were often adherents to
Sufi traditions.
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sworn against the kolkhozes at the mosque. Then, the movement swept over almost
the entire district.”99 The prominent role of women in the uprising probably
reflected the same calculation among the Uzbek peasantry as it did among peasants
in European Russia — namely, that women’s demonstrations or riots would more
likely go unpunished, and regime forces would use restraint when dealing with
them.100 On 10 March, a crowd of around 2000 people demanded to see the OGPU
plenipotentiary with a petition declaring that the murder of Soviet officials in
Bazar-Kurgan had been committed by the entire population. After being rebuffed,
they attacked the official.101 Thus, throughout several districts, large groups of
peasants acted in solidarity against their common foe — the Soviet regime. 
Because of the scale and intensity of these uprisings, authorities in Osh okrug
were quick to respond. On the second day of disturbances in Jalalabad, a regiment
of Red Army soldiers was dispatched to the city along with police and government
officials from Osh.102 An OGPU report described the government’s response to the
uprising in Bazar-Kurgan: 
The plenipotentiary of the GPU has been given orders to prepare to arrest the
instigators and active participants (aktiv), to take a hard line, to show the
population the counter-revolutionary nature of the demonstration, [and] in case
of need, to use force of arms (primenit´ oruzhie).103
However, with the end of violent demonstrations, the party apparatus seemed to
adopt the opposite course of action: in the aftermath of “Dizzy with Success” and
subsequent Politburo directives, the obkom and okrug party committee reversed the
decision to collectivize the entire okrug and implemented a series of measures
designed to mollify the peasantry. In particular, the okrug party committee sent in a
sizeable contingent of party members and 25-thousanders to conduct a propaganda
campaign and to right “excesses” (peregiby — namely, forced collectivization,
unlawful seizures, improper arrests, and so forth) committed by the collectivization
plenipotentiaries; it also sacked several district party secretaries, re-opened
livestock markets, temporarily suspended taxation, and agreed to advance money to
cotton-, silk- and grain-producers for future deliveries.104 Conciliatory policies
such as these were common throughout the Soviet Union. In the okrug as
elsewhere, they were accompanied by a massive outflow of peasants from
collective farms: between 1 April and 15 May 1930, official collective farm
enrollments fell from 41,651 to 11,017 peasant households (or from about 42
99. RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2141, l. 78 (PP OGPU v CA, “Massovye vystupleniia…”). 
100. Lynne Viola, “Bab´i Bunty and Peasant Women's Protest during Collectivization,”
Russian Review, 45, 1(1986): 38-39. 
101. RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2141, l. 60-61 (Karutskii, “Vneocherednaia svodka,” 08.03.1930).
102. Ibid., l. 32 (PP OGPU, “Zapiska po provodu,” 08.03.1930).
103. Ibid., l. 29 (PP OGPU, “Zapiska…”).
104. OOGA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 346, l. 7 (Politshtab Bazar-Kurganskogo raiona, “Protokol No. 16,”
10.03.1930).
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percent to 11 percent of the households in Osh okrug).105 The drop in enrollments in
the collective farms was greater in the okrug than in other areas of both the Kyrgyz
ASSR and the Soviet Union as a whole.106 Although party officials at all levels
were prepared to quell uprisings by brutal means, they also recognized the necessity
of mollifying large segments of the population engaged in key sectors of the
economy in an area where the regime lacked both political allies and effective
administration at the local level. 
The outcome of the February-March collectivization drive in Osh okrug,
therefore, took on the same characteristics of those in the rest of the Soviet Union.
Soviet officials in the districts dissolved many of the kolkhozes and agreed to turn
over lists of those who had joined them. Several of the sowing committee officials,
whose behavior had provoked the public’s wrath, were removed from their posts or
were arrested by the end of March.107 The revolt had coincided with Stalin’s
“Dizziness from Success” article in Pravda. In its wake, the republic party
organization launched inquiries into “excesses”: many of the district officials lost
their posts and others were forced to make apologies at party meetings and other
official venues. This small-scale Thermidor culminated in the censure and
reassignment of most of the okrug’s party leadership, including Chistiakov, Dvinov,
and Essenemanov, in mid-April.108 Concerned with reasserting control in the midst
of widespread disorder and rebellion throughout southern Kyrgyzstan (especially in
mountainous areas), the okrug bureau devoted little energy to the collectivization
movement, and enrollments continued to fall through the end of 1930. 
The abandonment of the collectivization campaign and bureaucratic reshuffling
failed to curb the resurgent basmachi rebellion. If anything, the suppression of the
peasant revolts had only strengthened the basmachi, as it sent hundreds of
participants fleeing into the mountains, where many joined guerrilla groups.109
Although the mountainous districts saw a lull in violence during the winter months
of 1929-1930, in May 1930, the basmachi again made forays into Soviet territory
from Kashgar, killing state and party officials, sacking government offices, and
destroying collective farms in Gul´cha, Uzgen, Naukat, and Bazar-Kurgan districts.
In August, to the surprise of a Russian district party official in Uzgen, Slavic
peasants from the village of Pokrovskoe united with the basmachi in looting
schools, state-run stores, cooperative organizations, and the post office in
Kurshab.110 The basmachi rebellion all but annihilated the collective farm
105. Loring, “Building Socialism”, 324. These reflect only official statistics; due to inflated
recruitment figures, lags in reporting exits from the collective farm system, and general
administrative disarray, real enrollments were likely lower. 
106. Loring, “Building Socialism,” 324-325. 
107. RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 2141, l. 76-79, (OGPU, “Massovye vystupleniia…”).
108. TsGA PD KR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 299, ll. 2-3. (Oshokruzhkom, “Protokol zasedaniia 4ogo
vneocherednogo plenuma,” 15/16.04.1930).
109. TsGA PD KR, f. 7, op. 1, d. 152, l. 19 (Fedotov, “Informatsionnoe pis´mo,” 28.07.1930).
110. TsGA PD KR f. 7, op. 1, d. 358, l. 22-23 (Sergeiuk, 03.08.1930).
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movement throughout much of the okrug and restricted the influence of the okrug
party bureau to the lowlands of the okrug and the district centers. The state was only
able to suppress the uprising and ensure a nominal degree of control after August
1930, when OGPU forces and volunteer detachments disarmed or scattered the
largest basmachi formations.111
Conclusion
In many respects, the mass resistance in Osh okrug in 1929-1930 represented an
anti-colonial revolt not unlike the revolt of 1916.112 In the lead-up to both events,
southern Kyrgyzstan was a colony and its population suffered from colonialist
policies. Predominantly Russian officials before and after the Revolution viewed the
region as a producer of raw materials, namely cotton and whatever foodstuffs and
draft animals were needed to maximize its production. Considerations of the welfare
of the population, while not entirely absent from discussions of Russian and Soviet
administrators, were secondary to the needs of the metropole. Moreover, the
administrators themselves were not drawn from the local population. Rather, the
local administration constituted a proxy for higher organs: at first, the General-
Governor’s administration and, later, the Russian-dominated obkom. The Tsarist
regime before 1916 was not nearly as interventionist as the Soviet regime, but there
are important parallels between the Tsarist conscription drive and the mass-scale
collectivization of 1929-1930. Like the Tsarists in 1916, the Soviet regime’s
administrators neither tailored policies from Moscow to the region’s specifics nor
did they afford local officials significant influence over the implementation. Instead,
the Soviet administration relied on “plenipotentiaries” (upolnomochennye) to force
the execution of ambitious campaigns. Six years after securing the region during the
Civil War, Bolshevik officials still governed the region much as the Tsarist
administration had fourteen years before. 
At the same time, however, the resistance also had specifically Soviet traits and
was quite different from the uprising of 1916. In the first place, acts of resistance
signified popular discontent at Soviet policies of the late 1920s, primarily the
forced enrollments in the collective farms in grain- and cotton-producing areas. The
popular slogans reported by the OGPU, however, also point to other grievances,
among them the unveiling campaign, the closure of mosques and sharia courts, and
the disenfranchisement of pre-revolutionary elites — all explicitly Soviet
initiatives. The resistance also explicitly targeted government institutions and
personnel — many of whom were indigenous Central Asians — rather than the
Slavic population as a whole. Instead, the Slavic population joined in the
destruction of Soviet establishments, uniting with the indigenous rebels against a
111. Loring, “Building Socialism”, 326-328.
112. For an explication of the anti-colonial nature of the revolt of 1916, see Daniel Brower,
Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 1-25. 
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common enemy. Finally, accounts of the outbreak of violence in Osh okrug read
very similarly to those of rebellions throughout the USSR in 1930-1931. This in no
small part is due to the conventions of OGPU document production
(deloproizvodstvo). It also suggests, however, that the rift between the party
leadership and local society in Osh okrug was not significantly greater than it was
in other areas of the Soviet Union: if the Bolsheviks were colonialists in southern
Kyrgyzstan, so too were they in rural Riazan´ or Siberia. 
In southern Kyrgyzstan, the resistance evolved from disparate acts to collective
action, representing the explosion of tensions that had been building among various
segments of rural society over the preceding several years. A wide range of party
policies had antagonized the diverse population of Osh okrug. In the grain- and
cotton-producing areas, any easing of tensions between the Soviet regime and the
rural society under NEP was reversed in 1927-28 by the Land and Water Reform,
restrictions on trade, grain requisitions, unveiling campaign, and the closure of
religious institutions. These measures prompted passive resistance (such as
sabotage, concealment of property, and foot-dragging), but generally did not
provoke violent acts. In the highlands, the campaign against “bai-manaps” in early
1929 led to the revival of the basmachi rebellion and a reprisal of the Civil War with
continuity of methods and even personnel. With the onset of collectivization, the
disparate groups of the okrug joined in a collective and widespread revolt which
took the regime several months to quell.
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